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A Call for Existentialism
Orson Welles' Citizen Kane showed America a tragic ascension from a child of poverty to an
elder of great affluence. The American dream that so many of us strive to obtain became a
nightmare of pride and worthlessness. Its popularity is undeniable - many "Top 100" lists place
the film at the very top. Many also hail The Great Gatsby as the greatest American novel. Our
society loves to tell itself that our ideals of life are often empty - that there is something
dreadfully wrong. Thankfully, there is always someone reminding us of the potential for
personal significance and self-actualization. Whether simply the contemporary United States of
America, the whole western world, or even humanity as a whole, we are asking ourselves deeply
existential questions with manifest discomfort. Three recent films, which have all been
welcomed by great popularityboth in American circles and abroad, have asked us the existential
question: "Who are you?" At the center of each of these films, questions of identity, meaning,
and self are raised in front of a society that responds with thrill and excitement. Watching these
films brings us - those of us bothered by the films in some way at least - to re-evaluate our
significance. We say, "What is it about my own self that makes it me, and do I like that? Is this
what I really am, or something that has been chosen for me?"
The most comic and unconventional of the three, Being John Malkovich proposes a
mechanism of science fiction and fantasy - or perhaps more appropriately of Descartes. A low
and uncertain puppeteer happens upon a tunnel within his office building that leads into John
Malkovich's mind. The tunnel becomes a business venture, and the movie a "film of the
absurd." A semi-physical space within Malkovich' s mind holds the secret to choice and will.
Central to the film however, the desire for autonomy and valid identity tortures an array of
emotional characters that have taken trips there. Questions about the soul and its relationship to
the body and self accompany a sense that the central characters are starving for meaning.
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Significance is absent from their lives until the tunnel is discovered - and the new identity
liberates them. In addition, Malkovich is neither particularly attractive nor personally charming;
yet being inside another person's existence is so thrilling to the main players and the dozens who
line up for the ride, that they become obsessed with its otherness. The movie shows its
audiences how invigorating an alternate identity must be. Further, certain existential issues such
as denial of death, responsibility in life, and authenticity of self are raised though not necessarily
resolved. Not only do people here take conscious control of another's body regularly, they
themselves seem lost searching for a claim to their own bodies.
Role-playing is something that most children experience as a vital learning tool that
contributes to social perception and behavior. It is also a common behavior among adults who
gain a thrill from escaping into another existence where worries and problems of the present and
past melt away. One can look at many modern phenomena as evidence of the newfound
popularity of such routines. Online chat boards, virtual reality, a whole class and the majority of
current video games, and even something as simple and ancient as dramatic acting all give
evidence to the delight of escaping away into someone else. Is the film critical of such behavior?
If this is the case, the only expression of criticism lies in the central character that eventually

maintains lasting control of Malkovich. His motivations for becoming another are not indicative
of a personal quest for the self. He takes control because he wants control. He fulfills desires
and aspirations that would not have been possible in his previous self. He makes forceful,
intrinsic changes that defy his true self. The puppeteer is the only character punished in the film.
Puppets are a central theme of Being John Malkovich for a reason. They show us that we all are
guided by an array of strings and rarely take the time to look inward at the puppeteer.
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Perhaps more directly addressing existential issues of personal responsibility and
individual authenticity, Fight Club stirs an interesting mix of Sartre and Freud beneath a frosting
of violence and alienation. Important issues in the film span a variety of social criticisms; yet the
core of the movie proposes to its audience that mainstream middle class America is slowly
hollowing itself out. We fill ourselves with Starbucks, furniture catalogs, and sports cars. Our
central protagonist, an unnamed narrator who at one point calls himself Cornelius, finds himself
at the beginning of the movie depressed and sleepless. Finding comfort and sleep becomes
possible only after he begins to take on phony alternate identities in order to attend group therapy
sessions. Testicular cancer, tuberculosis, and sickle cell anemia: these false disorders become
his sense of meaning and cause for release of all the angst that has built up through his life. His
disease is not as tangible as those of the support groups - he suffers from anonymity. Cornelius
becomes confronted with an inner id that resists his lifestyle with so much passion that a second
personality develops: Tyler Durden. This new personality starts Fight Club as just that - a club
for fighting among young and middle aged men - a release from the pressures of the Id. This is
not evident until the end of the film (that Tyler is his alternate personality) and therefore all of
the fights Cornelius has with him become solitary in retrospect. He is fighting his inner self for
determination of who he should be. This symbolism is strong, yet direct admonitions of other
messages litter the script: "You are not your job. You are not how much you have in the bank.
You are not the contents of your wallet." In one scene, Tyler drags a convenience store clerk to
the back lot and puts a gun to his head. He asks him, what did you really want to be? After
confused crying and pleas for mercy, the man finally responds, "A vet." Tyler then threatens
him, promising to come after him if he hasn't started to become a vet in a year. Cornelius is
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confused until Tyler tells him, "Tomorrow that man will have the best day of his life. His
breakfast in the morning will be the best meal he's ever had."
More issues of authenticity and autonomy in our identities, our collective and individual
responsibilities, and the existential confrontation of our deaths are raised - while the audience
witnesses a painful struggle for the resolution of two selves into one. The nameless man who
works for the nameless car company in a nameless town conflicts dramatically with Tyler
Durden, a man whose name is known all over the country and whose occupation is terribly
unconventional in comparison. Two men live in one, and the confrontation of the narrator's
internal pathos with his social ethos almost kills him.
More traditional in at least its outward appearance, American Beauty won five academy
awards in 1999. Lester Burnham introduces and concludes the film , and it is his story that
shapes it. His career is miserably indefinite, his home desperately normal, and his family
depressingly distant. Lester has a revelation that that which he found important in his life is
meaningless, and that his sense of personal identity has been destroyed by these motivations.
Heidegger describes this process as leveling. Society's measure of the desirable, impressing
itself upon him and choosing the path of his life for him, has failed Lester. At response to this
realization, Lester begins to choose. With deliberation, he begins to establish an identity and a
way of life that truly appeals to his potential self. The Lester that he becomes is less what his
culture has decided he should be, and so much more of what he actually is, and loves being.
Passion re-enters his life, and perspective descends like a blessing upon a previously blind
existence. Lester's passion for life is short-lived, however, for he is killed at the conclusion of
the film after merely hours of valid self-knowledge and absolved anxiety. Is Lester punished for
his success at resolute choice? His death at the crest of enlightenment may simply be a
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representation of the tragedy in modern life, yet the central point of the film remains clear: the
suburban world too often hides significance and authentic life beneath concerns that are so trivial
that they strangle our identities into nothingness.
Martin Heidegger, concerned with identity and authenticity issues very similar to those
mentioned above, discusses them in an existential context. It is evident from the films described
above that a call to existential thought is occurring in America. Whether or not this
philosophical movement is currently unique to the States or even prevalent today, many
American people, especially of younger generations, are asking for help and answers to
important existential questions. This school of thought is therefore valid on at least some levels
as a viewpoint from which to analyze contemporary social phenomenon. Several thinkers have
recently declared that this process of social leveling is reducing individual authenticity through
one particularly controversial drug: Prozac.
This infamous name is the commercial term for Fluoxetine - the first developed Selective
Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitor. SSRI's, self explanatory in name, control levels in the human
neuron of serotonin, a neurotransmitter with an experimentally proven relationship to depression,
anxiety, and general affect. l Effectively, an SSRI inserts itself into a pump that functions as a
conduit for neurotransmitters, limiting the capacity of serotonin sensitive neurons to reuptake the
free serotonin in the synapse, thus increasing the level of serotonin available to receptors in the
synapse. As a result, the number of receptors at the receiving end of a neural connection is
down-regulated, and signals become prolonged. Other successful drug treatments for depression,
anxiety, and obsessive-compulsive disorder (OeD) have been found to inhibit important
receptors in the brain as well, causing often strong and immediate side effects. Prozac and its
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relatives have become especially popular because these problems are far less prevalent and
severe in Prozac users.
SSRI's are called "selective" because their design only directly affects serotonin
receptors in the brain. This terminology is misleading, however, for the wide array of chemical
interactions at work in the brain functions as a complex system with interactions occurring in an
exceedingly complicated fashion. There is experimental evidence 2 suggesting that changes in
synaptic serotonin levels are correlated with opposing changes in dopamine, another
neurotransmitter that performs similar functions for different behaviors and biochemical states.
Exact evidence of how these reactions occur is not yet clear, yet there are a number of instances
of permanent and highly destructive side effects occurring as a result of other psychotropic
medications 3 that directly affect dopamine levels. 4 Dopamine neurons that project from the
substantia negra to the basal ganglia have been implicated in tics resulting from Thorazine use,s
and Joseph Glenmullen suggests from his findings that a similar reaction occurs indirectly
through Prozac use. 6
These concerns are just one kind of many that have arisen since the advent of
psychotropic medicine. From an existentialist perspective, a major concern of a marketed drug
that induces symptoms deemed more normal or appropriate by the current culture is that the
authentic identities of the individuals within that culture may be compromised. Or worse, the
introduction and phenomenal popularity of SSRI' s may compromise the core of our society
itself. The central argument made in most professionally published articles on this issue
concerns personal authenticity, autonomy, and change. Further, they ask if Prozac use is
explicitly inauthentic, or under what conditions one could describe its use as authentic.
Seemingly, the concept of authenticity held by these academics is slippery and difficult to grasp
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in explicit terms. A more direct analysis of authenticity and the explicit ways in which it relates
to changes in personal identity would contribute substantially to an understanding either side of
the authenticity argument. The purpose of this project therefore, is to establish conditions of
authentic or inauthentic change, present the prevailing arguments concerning the appropriateness
and authenticity of Prozac therapy, and finally to ascertain the explicit Prozac situations for
which one could attribute evaluations of authenticity.

Conditions of Authentic Personal Change
One of Heidegger' s most ubiquitous contributions to philosophical argument, the notion of
personal authenticity has provoked many contemporary thinkers into re-evaluating notions of
self concept and self-attainment. Several have argued that Kierkegaard's writings on the same
issue predate Heidegger's and are perhaps more robust in light of critical analysis. Sartre,
Nietzsche, and Camus have contributed further to our culture's conception of authenticity, and
psychologists such as Viktor Frankl and Rollo May have with substantial success transferred
existential ideas of the self into viable methods of psychotherapy. Although there is substantial
room for differentiation between these thinkers and their approach to authenticity, the concept
retains a broad conceptual definition and description across Existential thought. Such a
description will be attempted here, with an emphasis on what possible modes of personal change
are allowed within the scope of authenticity.
An explicit definition of personal authenticity seems at first relatively simple. Three of
the OED definitions of authentic do not relate specifically to objects or legal validity. "S. Real,
actual, 'genuine ... ' 7. Belonging to himself, own, proper; 8. Acting of itself, self-originated ... "
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary adds "true to one's own personality, spirit, or character." The
application of these concepts to individuals is not difficult to imagine. Following several
theories of the self, one can conceive of an inauthentic person whose behavior defies that
person's interior motivations and self-concept. However, this approach is not terribly useful in
truly comprehending Heidegger's notion of authenticity.
One way of understanding authenticity requires a set of categories under which all
personal approaches to the self can be classified. Heidegger's sense of authentic or inauthentic
behavior manifests in the following modes of being: 'Inauthenticity' occurs when an individual
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acts in the interest of fitting well with others. 'Averageness' occurs when someone who may
have once embraced an authentic self no longer attempts to achieve differentiation or fulfillment.
'Everydayness' happens similarly when a person no longer changes or critically evaluates the
self. 'Publicness' is a manifestation of fame, and occurs when someone losses the self in order
to support a public image. Authenticity, unlike the previous four categories of self, occurs in a
person who actively chooses self-differentiation, awareness, and achievement. This categorical
approach to understanding authenticity facilitates an understanding of existential values, yet
other approaches deal with the problematic construct in different ways.
One of these approaches attempts to deal with authenticity in a more indirect fashion.
Golomb argues that a positive definition of authenticity would be self-nullifying,7 and therefore
prefers to define inauthenticity instead. He evokes Sartre in describing authenticity as a negative
term - "something we are aware of when we flee it." Its presence is discerned in shifts of
inauthenticity. Both Kierkegaard and Heidegger categorize three forms of the inauthentic that
are latent in all of us as elements of human existence. Each form is also rooted in an aspect of
temporality. Heidegger associates ambiguity with the past, idle talk with the present, and
curiosity with the future. These are all in turn negative to the extent that they are manifestations
of behavior devoid of true meaning for the potential self. Each category also has a positive
counterpart that contributes to or stems from authenticity: feeling as one finds oneself, discourse,
and understanding, respectively.8 Later, Golomb describes authenticity in the specific context of
Heidegger's concept of Dasein. "To be authentic Dasein, therefore, is to grasp that one cannot
become authentic as an ontic entity among entities, as a static being, but only as the asking,
searching [being].,,9 Authenticity here is not a property or a state, but rather more of a process.
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A personal change that would risk a loss of authenticity as Golomb has described it
would therefore positively define inauthenticity. Rather than describing those changes that are
authentic, one can appropriately follow Sartre and Golomb's example. Inauthentic personal
change becomes in this case those processes of change made in flight from one's potential
authenticity. Perhaps changes related intrinsically to idle talk, curiosity, or ambiguity are also
implicated under this model. 10 It is perhaps difficult to imagine an inauthentic and voluntaristic
personal change resulting from idle talk or curiosity under this system. They are 1) founded in
the ignorance and pretense of the public, 11 2) result from an absence of care rather than a
presence of intention, 12 and 3) lack a procedural nature. Ambiguity however, is more ominous
when related to personal change. Whereas idle-talk and curiosity occur as specific occasions or
events, ambiguity develops over time. Decisions made by the individual that create ambiguity
by increasing self-avoidance at the expense of self-awareness must be considered directly
inauthentic under this model. Actions or especially personal projects undertaken in order to
escape from an anxiety-provoking element of personal experience, or from an awareness of that
element, necessarily increase ambiguity and must damage this sense of personal authenticity.
McDonough' s approach to defining personal authenticity takes an Aristotelian position
and asserts, "Authenticity and inauthenticity are not. .. contrary states," and can be
simultaneously present in an individual self.1 3 Under this model, authenticity is represented as a
mode of inauthenticity - a state described as the 'priority of inauthenticity.' Passages from
Being and Time support the notion that authenticity seems like a modification or property of the
they-self and everydayness. McDonough equates these ideas with in authenticity, perhaps too
readily, but continues only to cite passages from the same text that directly dispute this claim.
They create a state in which priority lies with authenticity. His conclusion and the resolution of
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this conflict is an Aristotelian approach - equating the relationship between authenticity and
inauthenticity with the relationship between form and matter. The argument continues further
and applies itself to Aristotelian notions of individuality. McDonough labels a new kind of selfindividuality to distinguish it from organic individuality, and subsequently defines authenticity in
terms of a categorical distinction, "[A]uthentic individuality consists precisely in transcending
one's natural types.,,1 4 That which makes one authentic, in other words, is that which is not
derived from natural type. This type is seemingly one determined by biology and sociology.
Authenticity here becomes something like traits distinguishable from those of other members of
the same group; and further, these traits are chosen at will to be evoked by the authentic
individual. Although accounting handily for the existential importance of freedom, this approach
seems to render issues of anxiety and resolution less than important to the true distinction
between authenticity and inauthenticity. Arguably, such a change in the nature of the theory
removes the specifically existential nature of Heidegger' s notion of authenticity.
Despite this possible incongruence, an evident distinction between personal changes as
either authentic or inauthentic can be made from McDonough's argument. Choices made that
differentiate an individual from his peers (of whatever sort) plainly contribute to that individual's
authenticity. What choices could then be distinguished as resulting in a loss of authenticity?
Personal changes of the self that are made explicitly in order to remove those qualities that set an
individual apart from his natural grouping can be described as inauthentic under this Aristotelian
model.
llham Dilman approaches the Existential issue of authenticity within the context of a
critique of Cartesian thought. His approach emphasizes that the series of events comprising a
person's life can be said to contribute to his authenticity to the extent that he himself participates
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in his own 'intellectual and emotional learning. ,15 This notion as described by Dilman can be
divided into three qualifications that distinguish a personal change as authentic. Primarily, the
individual must be an active agent in his own development. Reasonably, outside forces can and
necessarily do contribute to personal growth, yet he whose life seeks authenticity makes an
assertive and crucial contribution to that life through decision-making and attitude.
Subsequently, one must maintain personal responsibility and answerability for the self. Dilman
interprets Sartre in general terms by noting that an authentic person not only enters into his own
development, but also claims responsibility for his actions and hesitations. One must be
"answerable ... for who he is, as well as for failing to be who he is.,,16 For Sartre and others,
responsibility demands awareness as well. 17 Without continuous self-evaluation, one cannot
maintain awareness and therefore has no true capacity to answer for his own self and its nature.
Finally, Dilman discloses the issue of resolution. For Dilman, decision-making and choice as
described above are not as critical as Sartre insists. Important resolutions are resolved through
affective processes such as assimilation or grieving - neither through a calculated verdict
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nor a

claim to answerability. Emotionality and psychological coping mechanisms seem to be evoked
here. Resolution as a process is integral to an understanding of authentic choice in slightly
different ways as well. One can conceive of this not only as an affective process designed to
deal with conflict, but also as the resulting ongoing union of conflicting elements in the self.
There are therefore three fundamentals of authenticity - choice, awareness, and resolution. Each
will be used as a position from which to create theoretical arguments for the relationship between
authenticity and personal change.
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Choice
The first of these three elements entails far more than a simple decision or preference. Choice
and freedom are essential to existential thought in that the essence of existence is defined by
choice itself. Sartre contends that freedom of choice is plainly concurrent with man's being, and
. definitive to its nature, 19 Heidegger associates individual decision making with finding the self,2o
Jaspers describes choice as defining the self,21 and Kierkegaard's writings imply that choice is
implied in the very structure of the self as finite and actualized freedom. In his Existence and

Freedom, Shrag asserts in development of this last notion that "choice is the indispensable
condition for an attainment of an authentic awareness and acceptance of one's finitude.,,22 This
concept is evidently not just fundamental to an understanding of existential authenticity, but also
more universally to an understanding of the self.
Kierkegaard describes several illusions of choice, or circumstances under which one ' s

Dasein perceives a choice that is either unwilled or partial. One example of such a choice would
be made for aesthetic reasons:
Therewith you have chosen ... not, to be sure, as you yourself will admit, the
better part. But in reality you have not chosen at all, or it is in an improper sense
of the word you have chosen. Your choice is an aesthetic choice. 23
Aesthetic here applies not to art, but to immediacy, pleasurable preference, and perhaps even
hedonism or rationalism, which all fall under Kierkegaard's description of the aesthetic
existence-sphere. Life for an aestheticist is simply a succession of nows, and Kierkegaard is
very critical of such a lifestyle. True, authentic choice must be a choice made with total selfpossession,24 genuine pathos,25 and a regard for all temporal modes - past, present, and future.
Choice is also more than the decisions made at critical turning points in an individual's lifestyle.
It is the earnestness and resoluteness with which a choice is made that determines its validity, yet
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this will be discussed in more detail later. Further, choice taken to a more metaphorical level,
and pointed back at the individual making the choice creates a new dimension of this concept.
Ultimately, choice here is not just decisions made at critical moments, but perhaps even a state of
one having chosen himself over the they-self
"Even the richest personality is nothing before he has chosen himself, and on the other
hand, even what one might call the poorest personality is everything when he has chosen
himself; for the great thing is not to be this or that but to be oneself.,,26
In a sense, the choice of oneself over the public ethos is also critical to this notion, pointing back
to McDonough's interpretation of authenticity.
Kierkegaard refers to the public on several occasions as a "monstrous abstraction,,27 that
can and does assume the function of making decisions for the individual. As a result, we find
Heidegger describing all of those who do not take an active, assertive, and attentive role in their
own personal development as becoming a "stultifying standardization and conventionalism in
which everyone is undecided.,,28 Heidegger also discusses a process of leveling, the name he
gives to the tendency of the public to remove those aspects of Dasein that distinguish an
individual from the crowd. 29 Inauthenticity is portrayed in Being and Time as a ' temptation'
present at the ontic level of public everydayness. Escape into distraction and equanimity, away
from the anxiety that in itself calls us to acknowledge our potential for the authentic - this is the
temptation offered by the public that levels members of a society towards its norms.
Are there means of personal change not yet discussed that as a result of these ideas
become decidedly inauthentic? McDonough's position on authenticity has already revealed the
nature of those changes made to fit the crowd. Choice however, sheds light on how one could in
fact undergo personal change not as a result of individual motivation, but from the decision made
by the "monstrous abstraction" of the public. If at any time one opts not to choose his own
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personal outcome, the public to which he belongs will eventually choose one for him. Without
making the decision that the self is the ultimate choice of his existence, the human being loses
his authenticity as the crowd takes control of personal development. This position of not
choosing the self levels man, producing a "fractional, depersonalized, and irresponsible man. It
reduces him to ... [being] identified with his functions.,,3o Such a state is unquestionably
inauthentic from an existential standpoint. Heidegger describes an individual subjected to such
leveling such as this as "fallen" and "anonymous.,,31
Awareness
The second fundamental of authenticity distinguished, awareness is closely intertwined with this
complex issue of choice. As stated above, true choice is made with resolve and concern, and
existential choice chooses the self. Kierkegaard's definition of self is interesting to note in this
context, however. In his Sickness unto Death he evaluates the self as purely a reflexive relation,
or perhaps duplication. 32 For Kierkegaard, the self is explicitly the act of self-evaluation.
Further, Sartre defines authenticity by saying that it "consists of having a true and lucid
consciousness of the situation, responsibility for the self, and acceptance of the self.,,33
Knowledge of the self - awareness of what thoughts, feelings, and motivations create one - must
preface these three qualities Sartre discusses. Consciousness immediately follows from selfknow ledge, true responsibility in essence requires this consciousness likewise to be realized, and
self acceptance can obviously only occur in actuality if the individual understands that self which
it accepts to some limited degree.
As Golomb points out, dislocation from the self is a theoretical necessity of selfevaluation. Simply put, one must step outside oneself in order to truly evaluate it beyond the
signs it receives from alien sources. One can learn of his own behavior, and even determine his

17

motivations, strictly from observing the behaviors and reactions of those around him, yet such an
evaluation of the self is doomed to inadequacy. From an existential perspective, self observation
made solely through the eyes of others would be hollow. Such a viewpoint of the self roots it in
societal norms and ethos, and strips the true identity and uniqueness to be found there. The
leveling process described earlier becomes an even more personally directed act when selfawareness is limited to others. Authentic self-evaluation must therefore point inward and seek
knowledge that independently describes and differentiates the individual. True responsibility for
a self defined strictly in terms of social evaluations is impossible. What binds a man to those
actions, emotions, and motivations he experiences and potentially owns, if social referencing is
his only method of self-definition? True acceptance of the self likewise cannot be made if the
self that is accepted is defined untenably. Direct self-evaluation from an assumed dislocated
perspective is therefore crucial to a move towards authentic change.
Berthold-Bond describes the "resoluteness" of Heidegger' s authenticity as a "reencounter [with] the self, no longer. .. absorbed in its unreflective fascination with the everyday,"
but awakened in a dislocated "moment of vision.,,34 This moment of vision described by
Heidegger is directly provoked by anxiety. His approach to anxiety is perhaps one of the most
important elements of existentialism, and its role in authenticity is crucial. Only through
accepting one's own self and the anxiety that comes with approaching such awareness can one
reach towards personal authenticity. Both Kierkegaard and Heidegger insist that anxiety is the
"gateway to authentic existence,,,35 for only through suffering can one truly come to question and
evaluate the self. Shrag further notes that experiences of anxiety reveal three aspects of Dasein:
1) the strange and uncanny; 2) isolation and loneliness; and 3) freedom for authentic
potentiality. Without anxiety, Dasein would have no awareness that authenticity and
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inauthenticity are potential qualities of its being. 36 Anxiety can therefore be described as a call
to awareness, or a communication of being-in-the-world made to the self. This notion will be
discussed in further detail later.
Several implications on intentional personal change arise here. First, a change made in
avoidance of or in replacement for personal knowledge and self-awareness must be inauthentic.
Acceptance of the self must be made before true change can occur towards the potential self.
With no knowledge of why the previous self held its certain properties, with no understanding of
why it should be changed and what consequences such a change may have on the individual
Dasein, such a change is more accurately a shift towards a different, more desirable self.

Changes made in an effort to improve and maintain the self can only occur with awareness and
comprehension - without these, such a process becomes metaphorical burial and self-imposed
Ignorance.
The social sphere holds as much importance as the personal one, for changes motivated
by self-evaluations that are fixed in judgments made strictly by the crowd are inauthentic. Few
of our personal goals or accomplishments are devoid of societal motivation. Our life is
inextricably bound up in interaction with others, and caring for the opinions of those around us.
Heidegger himself understood and integrated this notion into his ideology.37 This distinction is
necessary, however, in order to point out that personal change must be primarily individual and
earnest, while educated and aware, in order to escape the temptation of distraction that society
has to offer. If one does not choose himself, the crowd will choose for him.
Lastly, an act made in avoidance of existential anxiety is decidedly inauthentic, especially
under the circumstance that the anxious in no way seeks to understand the source of this anxiety.
Such is evident, as Heidegger's descriptions of inauthenticity repeatedly evoke images of fleeing
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and escape from potentiality. This anxiety calls awareness into being, and such a process is often
portrayed in existential fiction as very painful and difficult, yet liberating in conclusion. 38 These
writers, at least, have a conception of authenticity that requires painful self-analysis - and a
talent to describe alienation in the most treacherous fashion. Perhaps the most tormenting
element of this new vision-in-anxiety is the actual inauthenticity of the individual. Such a
realization, coupled with significant import, would be theoretically quite devastating to a
person's sense of self. Running from the anxiety that begs for the release of such knowledge is
an expected response, yet it solves nothing if the resolution of this anxiety is the desired end.
Resolution

From these categories of authenticity - awareness and choice - several clear situations of
personal change that could be labeled as inauthentic surface. One final category of personal
change through which authenticity could be evaluated is resolution. 39 Despite the fact that the
perspective is less frequently cited among commentaries on Heidegger, resolution holds
relevance to the issue in several ways. As is evident above, choice and awareness are worth little
if they are held with slight resolve. Important in the degree to which one commits to oneself and
takes full reasonability for those qualities, resolve solidifies identity through the perspective of
motivation: strong enthusiasm implies a strong personal commitment.
Secondary to this, one should normally find difficulty resolving conflicts of the self. In
the case that one has attributes or motivations that hinder one another, anxiety naturally leads to
self-denial and a lapse of awareness. Resolution is important therefore, in determining the
degree to which one can align disparate qualities of the self into a cohesive whole. If (despite
discomfort) the capacity or level of effort put forth towards justifying such qualities is low, one
has little potential to ever truly accept or embrace valid and integral aspects of his personality
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and experience. Resolution here becomes the process by which internal conflict is resolved. As
above, the 'easy' path that circumvents complicated conflicts indicates a self-perpetuating
inauthentic route in one's personal projects.
Finally, a third perspective of authenticity in the category of resolution calls upon anxiety
itself. Psychodynamic thought explains uncomfortable sensations such as depression, anxiety, or
OeD not in terms of a disrupted biological balance or an inappropriate learned behavior, but

rather as a symptom of the need for the ego to resolve conflict between opposing internal drives.
The humanity of a person and the experiences that he or she goes through create psychological
states both good and bad. Resoluteness or resolution can also be described as the counter-weight
with which the desires that do not work well within us maintain equilibrium. Through
symptomology, conflicts are resolved and the subconscious lets off steam - uncomfortable
attributes of the self are still the self, and are not instruments of outside intervention. In addition,
one must acknowledge the role that such symptoms play in our personal experience as agents of
resolution, or the authentic self has been avoided.
To sum up, if one assumes that a psychodynamic perspective has at least conceptual
validity, one can therefore conclude that resolution is integral to authentic change in three ways:
1 - If one is resolute in his commitment to his personal change, the process becomes more
authentic. 2 - If one resolves the anxiety of personal conflict through confrontation rather than
circumvention, one engages in authentic change. 3 - If one addresses uncomfortable personal
behaviors as an agent of balance within the self, rather than a biological symptom of an alien disease, one has taken an authentic approach to self-understanding.
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Transition

Personal change occurs in all members of humanity, as a natural result of learning and the
confrontation with experience that is life. Further, it is our obligation to our own experiences,
and to our own sense of fulfillment, to be ourselves. One would not dare to expect perpetual
authenticity of the most acetic sort from each and every individual, regardless of exclusive
situations at all times. Heidegger and Kierkegaard understood and accepted the fact that social
beings require social interaction, and that most of life is conducted along the lines of inauthentic
experience. We learn primarily through imitation of our family, elders, and peers - not through
individuation of unique qualities or motivations. One does not need to choose which value meal
at McDonalds one would prefer based on the implications such a choice has on internalized
childhood anxieties. It is critical to note, however, that although most of life may be inauthentic,
critical times arise at which choices of the self must be made carefully, and with regard for the
importance of authenticity and the role that it plays in personal development.
For example, one should evaluate one's career carefully, in order to ensure that it has
personal significance - even if that significance lies only in supporting a family or one's
aspirations to maintain other, less profitable pursuits. One should evaluate parenting, teaching,
political ideology based on personal alignment to specific issues - not along comfortable lines
delineated by Heidegger's monstrous abstraction. And why should one evaluate anything? What allows me to make the judgment that anyone should do anything at all? We owe it to
ourselves to actualize our inner motivations, to create significance and satisfaction where it is
possible. We owe it to ourselves to understand and participate actively in the emotional and
internal events that occur every day. We owe it to our friends, our families, and our peers to
attempt to understand the interpersonal effects of our behaviors as well. Perhaps however,
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dramatically different from this idea of obligation, a much truer and less comforting truth exists.
Is it possible that the one thing we should do is to take responsibility and ownership of those
things that compose us? We should face ourselves head on, and doing so realistically requires
making important and explicit choices at distinct moments. There are times in all of our lives
when we realize, "The choice I make here and now will specify who I am."
A very specific example of this sort of choice has arisen over the past several years, with
the advent of a drug that reportedly induces personal change of a socially desirable sort - with
little physical consequence, relative monetary ease, and a small sacrifice to time. Prozac, and the
family of drugs described by the acronym SSRI, have asked us, "Would you like to be more
productive and content without directly resolving all of the personal problems that have
developed in your life? Do you enjoy this self that you have become? What does it mean to be
you?"
What are we to answer? Apparently, America has decided to answer by saying yes to
Prozac. Sub-clinical prescriptions of Prozac use are shockingly common, seemingly
administered regularly by medical professionals with little to no experience with antidepressants. Many of us have come to accept that Prozac fixes a chemical imbalance in the brain
that has nothing to do with our personal experience and the complex development of our
personal selves. We are listening to Prozac, and believing the lies that it tells us about ourselves.
This drug describes our emotional experiences as robotic reactions to ephemeral disease entities
for which we have no responsibility. This drug tells us what behavior and temperaments are best
for today's world, and medicalizes the rest. This drug turns our anxiety, depression, and
alienation into a pest that should be exterminated without recognition for its significance or
source.
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Prozac treats these conditions on a clinical level with surprising efficacy and sympathetic
side effects,40 yet there are dangerous side effects that have not been addressed outside of
clinical and biological research, and most practitioners (and especially the general public) are
ignorant of this evidence. 41 The implications of Prozac use on the authenticity of individuals in
our society has been debated hotly, though theoretical evidence for the inauthenticity of Prozac
use is often flimsy and unelaborated - almost intuitive in nature. The following section will
address the first major public release of ethical and philosophical debate over the concern with
Prozac: Listening to Prozac by Peter D. Kramer. A discussion of newer issues of enhancement
technology follows, and in conclusion the specific situations of authenticity described above will
be compared with sub-clinical Prozac use in an effort to assess the validity of prevalent claims
that SSRI drug therapy is an inauthentic mode of personal change.
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Listening to Alienation
Listening to Prozac spawned intense discussion and debate in many circles across the United
States, as it confronted newly surfacing issues of prescription drug use. The book presents case
studies of Prozac patients, and discusses concerns with the drug in light of these individuals.
Problems that Kramer senses in the public and professional settings are raised and seemingly
resolved with a warning and ultimately support for the treatment. Kramer rightly senses the
dangers of biological materialism, especially when discussing the ethics of SSRI' s, yet
seemingly fails to heed his own warning. He seems disturbed by his own case of biological
materialism, yet continues to make errors in support of his claims that spawn from such an
ideology.
There are critical elements of existentialist authenticity that Kramer's Listening to Prozac
addresses, yet fails to resolve. First, Kramer mentions and denies Sullivan's issues with mood
enhancers regarding autonomy in processes of personal change. Second, he restates and disputes
Nesse's argument that there exists a human utility in anxiety. Lastly, he summarizes and
undermines Schwartz's claims that Prozac interferes with the appropriate resolution of anxiety.
Each of these three notions provide evidence for the inauthenticity of SSRI' s as isolated
treatment, and although Kramer challenges them all as invalid, he fails to do so convincingly.
Social arguments against the use of Prozac are not new, and Kramer takes the opportunity
to defend its use while "mood brighteners" was still the commonly used name for prescription
drugs used in sub-clinica142 situations. The phrase refers to any class of drugs that upsets the
balance of risk and benefit by which questionable treatments can be evaluated. Such a process
occurs when a drug such as Prozac arises and causes neither addiction nor adverse side effects.
Robert Aranow and Mark Sullivan wrote an article
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on mood brighteners in an effort to discuss
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philosophical and concrete issues that arise from such a class of drugs. They argue that the
resolution of the "lost yardstick" for ethical evaluation occurs only by using a new one:
autonomy. lllness compromises autonomy, and therefore valid treatment includes an addicting
drug, or one with side effects. An addicting drug, without medical justification, along the same
lines compromises autonomy through compulsion. The use of mood brighteners, because
unjustified by an actual illness, compromises autonomy by removing an individual from valid
components of personal experience - such as despair. Kramer dissolves this argument by
asserting that the hypothetical sub-clinical patient used in many models such as this one does not
exist, and does not respond to Prozac in a way that fits this model. He finds that in the majority
of his patients their sense of personal autonomy is not compromised because many choose not to
take the drug any longer after witnessing its effects on their behavior. One of his first case
studies mentioned involves a young man who decides not to take the drug any longer, because its
use convinced him that those aspects of his self that he was initially trying to remove were so
personal that their absence made him uncomfortable. Further, the understanding of mood
brighteners embraced by Aranow and Sullivan does not represent Kramer's conception of
Prozac, and the argument is therefore invalid. In addition, Kramer's interpretation of the
problems to which Prozac should apply justifies them as states worthy of medical treatment. He
portrays his patients as "struggling, handicapped, and often socially isolated.,,45 Perhaps Kramer
avoids the argument that Aranow and Sullivan make by addressing different issues: the nature of
Prozac and its interaction with human behavior, and the diagnosis of psychological states as
'normal' or worthy of treatment.
Kramer brings up several other viewpoints concerning Prozac, in order to refute their
claims that its widespread use is personally and socially unhealthy. The first of these in his
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chapter "The Message in the Capsule," is a protest brought by Richard Schwartz, which claims,
"mood brighteners interfere with a person's relationship with reality.,,46 Schwartz concedes that
his argument does not suffice, and therefore turns to a central idea of psychotherapy: affect
tolerance" Zetzel coined this term to convey the idea that individuals differ in their ability or
tendency to resist extreme emotional states. One who could be described as having resilience
and resistance to stress or grief, for example, would have a high affect tolerance. Schwartz gives
an original example of culturally determined norms of pathologically classified behaviors:
spousal grief. Claiming that simple mood improvement disconnects the individual from personal
experience, he continues to criticize "mood brighteners" and their prescription for individuals
who have been grieving for only one year. Schwartz cites rural Greece, where 5 years is the
appropriate time for spousal bereavement - seemingly attributing the difference in length to
cultural differences in affect tolerance.
Kramer disputes these claims with an insufficient rebuttal, contending that he sees no
problem with medicating bereavement that deviates from social norms. He builds his defense of
Prozac on grounds that departure from cultural norms establishes illness. First, proving one
example of a phenomenon as invalid when the grounds for this proof are questionable does not
render a claim impotent. Kramer has not shown that the central point is invalid: despite rural
Greece and its widows, experiential recovery does lead to integration of experience and chemical
mood improvement does lead to disconnection from experience. Secondly, Kramer seems to
miss the point: doctors are treating normal variations of human experience as diseases. He
misses it so dramatically that he uses it as grounds for dismissal. Third, the fact that antidepressants are the method of treatment employed in bereavement cases is crucial to Schwartz's
argument. Schwartz is not making a statement about anthropology - he criticizes a specific
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mode of therapy that is used in a wider range of cases than is ethically appropriate. Kramer
dismisses an ethical contention against the liberal use of mood-brighteners in two pages of text,
without an effective argument. It should be evident from the distinctions made here that his
assessment has little validity.
The next on Kramer's list of Prozac nay sayers, Randolph Nesse utilizes the evolutionary
perspective of biological psychology to bring the notion of utility in anxiety towards a
commentary on mood brighteners. Mild depression can be explained in animals as a mechanism
designed to reallocate energy and resources. Nesse suggests that a similar situation may be at
work among mankind. It follows that individuals suffering from sub-clinical dis-ease with no
clear experiential cause should recognize that evolutionary mechanisms might be at work.
Further, Nesse establishes that a sense of guilt for the condition should be relieved upon
recognition of this fact. These sensations of anxiety and depression that are sub-clinical and
socially stimulated should be accepted as a useful evolutionary mechanism, not as an illness. In
conclusion, mood brighteners may not be an appropriate response to such emotional states.
Kramer transforms these theoretical, atavistic experiences into an animal-like element of
human experience that perhaps should be relieved through medication - as a "particularly
humane intervention.,,47 Again, it seems that Kramer disagrees with an element of the opposing
argument that was taken for granted within its line of reasoning. Nesse seems concerned with
the fact that a natural, evolutionary condition that may still have validity in modern society has
come to be viewed as a negative trait and treated as a disease. Prescription medications with
possible serious and permanent side effects are appropriate for illnesses alone. If a naturally
developed human condition that is recognizably sub-clinical should be altered, such a procedure
should be made by other means. Prozac is not a vitamin or mineral with plainly positive effects.
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SSRI's are a strong, serious, and poorly understood class of drugs that directly influence the
brain in ways that markedly shift behavior and physiology. Nesse did not have the knowledge to
argue this point, yet the issue that he does address is not effectively undermined by Kramer's
opposing argument.
Kramer discusses the major objections of Schwartz & Nesse as follows: "they
(unhelpfully) free the taker from struggling with reality and thus achieving affect tolerance; they
act to reinforce dehumanizing social expectations; they interfere with adaptive mechanisms
developed over eons of evolution; and they encourage people to understand as illness aspects of
the self that are normal. 48" Kramer responds to each claim in tum, attempting to invalidate these
general objections to Prozac. In protest to Schwartz's claims about affect tolerance, Kramer
returns to Zetzel's psychotherapeutic methods. A quick comparison provides Kramer with one
of his favorite analogies in defense of Prozac: "What happens to people in psychotherapy is
similar to what happens when they take Prozac." 49 Objections to Prozac in preference of
"human" therapy are dismissed as pharmacological Calvinism. The problem for Schwartz,
according to Kramer, is not what Prozac aims to accomplish, but that it is a chemical agent rather
than an interpersonal one. Consequently, Kramer establishes a similar argument against the
contention that Prozac use reinforces the dehumanization of social expectation. By arguing that
if varied emotional and interpersonal states are natural, he claims that Prozac only shifts an
individual between states that already exist. As many have, he therefore likens SSRI use to
plastic surgery and psychotherapy in that both medical and cosmetic applications exist. Again, if
this is true, the problem with Prozac must be its means and not its end.
There are two problems with Kramer's dismissal of these claims. First, interpersonal
interaction (within the context of therapy) aims at the realization of both self-understanding and
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autonomy. Prozac cannot provide these, for pills do not explain their effects to each individual
as they alter emotional experience. Understanding of the self plays no role in the inhibition of
serotonin re-uptake at the appropriate neurons in the brain. The swallowing of a pill and its
anticipated effects may be entirely intentional and voluntary, yet the chemical process is not
interactive. Further, the recurrence of depression or anxiety after the cessation of SSRI
mono therapy alone is far higher than recurrence rates for dual therapy or psychotherapy.
Autonomy is not established through Prozac if the individual requires an indefinite prescription
in order to maintain its desired outcomes. Second, analogy to previously accepted practice does
not validate potentially unacceptable new ones. Several independent studies have replicated
findings proving that SSRI's can cause permanent brain damage in long-term users. There have
obviously been no reported cases of psychotherapy causing permanent brain damage. Beyond
implications of serious side effects, Kramer makes what Erik Parens calls an argument of
precedent. 5o He describes it as follows: "We've always used means A to achieve end A; means

B also aims to achieve end A; therefore means B is morally unproblematic."
Two problems arise when using such an argument, and Kramer makes both mistakes.
First, when treating different means as morally the same, one potentially makes the error of
assuming that the means have the same object, or focus. For example, assuming that Prozac is
morally acceptable and just as authentic as psychotherapy implies that altering understanding and
a specific behavior set is morally equivalent to directly altering a set of chemicals in the brain
that are intimately connected with that set of behaviors. In assuming that such a distinction is
irrelevant, one further implies that the end results of each means are not contingent upon this
difference. In fact, the ends must be unequivocally different because of this distinction.
Interpersonal therapeutic processes occur along individually tailored paths, as an interaction
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particular to both therapist and client. Serotonin receptors are affected in the same fashion in all
human brains when an SSRI is introduced. 51 One cannot ignore this difference if attempting to
qualify the two methods of therapy as equal. On the other hand, different means often embody
or embrace different ideals. By advocating drug therapy for conditions that have proven
potential for success through psychotherapy of various kinds, one embraces the mechanization of
man. 52 Kramer himself points in his introduction to the striking trend at the turn of the twentieth
century for our society to view our behaviors along a trend he describes as biological
materialism. He specifically refers to the medicalization of the man he calls Sam as a disturbing
phenomenon - that which he dubs "Listening to Prozac."
Revealing the Self and Balancing the Humors
Kramer makes many revealing statements about his personal experiences with Prozac. One of
the most radical assertions he makes about the drug asserts that Prozac has utility as a kind of
yardstick of the self. "They learned something about themselves from Prozac .... they believed
Prozac revealed what in them was biologically determined and what merely experiential.,,53
This statement is not only flawed, yet is also indicative of a serious problem occuring in the
mainstream and how it responds to concepts of disease and medicine. SSRI's are not
instruments designed to determine which authentic elements of the self are due to genetics and
which are due to experience. First, Prozac does not return the chemical state of the brain to some
previous state that should be considered any more proper or healthy. Prozac makes distinct
changes in brain chemistry that result in a certain set of healthier behaviors because it
specifically imbalances the current brain chemistry towards this end. This has been shown
empirically through studies exploring the long-term side effects of SSRI'S.54 Generally,
fluoxetine (Prozac) results in less receptivity to the chemical serotonin. All of the desired
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changes associated with fluoxetine have been tied specifically to this chemica1. 55 The brain's
methods of detecting its levels of serotonin are disturbed, however. As a result, levels of
dopamine - a chemical closely related to and highly interactive with serotonin - theoretically
shift in response to these changes. Eventually, a far more complex set of reactions begins to
occur as the brain tries desperately to achieve balance. Increasing resistance to the initial drug
treatment, semi-permanent damage (tardive dyskinesia, a symptom of Parkinson's disease) due
to shifting dopamine levels, and dramatic shifts in behavior result. 56 These changes in outward,
social behavior are the designed purpose of SSRI' s and the reason the drug is perceived as a
normalizer. SSRI's do not restore original, natural chemical balance to the brain. SSRI's do not
repair genetically determined damage to the complex system of receptors and enzymes in the
human brain. They shift the manifestation of these chemicals to a level that must not be in any
biological sense more normal, since brain damage is a proven long-term result. This new
manifestation is apparently more normal or at least desirable in a social sense, however, for news
of replicated studies proving the deteriorating effects of long term SSRI use must be unpopular
and has yet to become mainstream.
Second, this erroneous supposition that changes due to a drug such as Prozac are "fixing"
biologically determined states and bypassing experiential ones harbors a serious error of
causality. Many studies have proven that a genetic component exists for psychological states
such as depression. None have shown that major depression, generalized anxiety, or even
obsessive compUlsive disorder (OeD) have purely genetic roots, however. All of these disorders
are treatable with both SSRI's and psychotherapy. Obviously, shifts in brain chemistry cause
shifts in behavior, yet one must recognize that it also runs the other way, and shifts in behavior
cause shifts in brain chemistry. Each represents and controls the other, and attributions of
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strictly biological causality to psychological phenomena should be made with great care.
Elements of experiential personality that can be distinguished from genetic personality (and vice
versa) do not exist with any real clarity, as each are merely constructs developed for the sake of
linguistic ease. Moreover, the chaotic nature of human experience and the complexity of our
genetic framework are such that distinctions of this sort are inherently fallible. To retrace our
steps temporarily, let me reiterate that these disorders are treatable with either drug therapy or
psychotherapy. There is strong evidence that drug therapy is more likely to succeed over a
shorter period of time. Permanence after use of the drug has ceased is much less likely, however,
save in cases of dual therapy (implementing both drug therapy and cognitive-behavioral
therapy). If the use of Prozac restores or repairs biologically damaged brain tissue, why is it that
conditions of melancholy, depression, anxiety, shyness, obsession, and compulsion are more
likely to relapse after the cessation of Prozac monotherapy than after the cessation of dual
therapy?57 Cognition, emotion, memories, or even attitudes must play some very integral role in
these disorders, independent of their root in biological factors. If the objectionable elements of
our personalities are purely biological and the desired elements due strictly to experience, why is
it that the chances of relapse under drug therapy are so much higher? The conception that certain
psychological disorders are caused by a disease - e.g. by a "chemical imbalance" - does not
stand well against a realistic evaluation of these causal attributions.
There exists a third reason that Prozac could not have "revealed what in [the patients]
was biologically determined and what merely experiential." Psychopharmacological agents
could cause any number of changes in human behavior. The fact that LSD may cause a person
to see themselves as a Martian and behave in a strikingly Martian manner does not mean that the
person taking LSD is truly a Martian, and only a human due to flaws in his genetic make-up. He
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may well believe this to be the case under the influence of the drug, yet this does not mean that
his authentic self is such. Similarly, Prozac does not release a true self from within an
unfortunately determined shell just because one feels like one's true self after taking the drug.
One could argue that this analogy is inappropriate since LSD is classified as a hallucinogen, and
Prozac as an anti-depressant. Both change brain chemistry, however, in critical ways that alter
personal experience - one should not carelessly qualify SSRI's as resulting in authentic
experiences of self because they are comfortable ones that patients identify as their true selves.
Kramer himself points to the notion that scientists attend to the evidence that best
supports social needs. Our society, arguably strained by alienation, loneliness and depression,
wants to hear that our current state is due to a biological cause over which we have no personal
control. It is easier to accept a "chemical imbalance" at work within the numinous brain. Such a
problem naturally should be fixed with chemicals. In a world of prescription marketing, I
presume that it is far more comfortable living spiritually addicted to derivatives of Prozac than
desperately groping at signs of meaning. However, should we as individuals accept this state of
affairs, we may become substance-driven robots, treating ourselves with drugs of complacency
that our television offers in return for extended mindlessness.
Comfort induced by chemicals does not prove discomfort induced by chemicals.
Unfortunately, the new and public biochemical model of human behavior often neglects the
complex causality of the brain. Such a viewpoint supports the notion mentioned above of
"chemical imbalance." Empedocles' medicine of the four cardinal humors exemplifies a similar
approach. Each of four bodily components (bile, blood, phlegm, and lymph) was said to relate
causally with temperament. To make the mistake that serotonin, a chemical directly affected by
SSRI's, is solely responsible for depression or OCD is a fallacy. Causation is not something
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simple and discrete, a default relationship in a one-way causal attribution. Our understanding of
causality must embrace the organic causality, and a more complex understanding of the human
brain should be coupled with the understanding that causation does not occur in one-way paths
with obvious relationships as the only valid ones. None of the arguments in the nature vs.
nurture debate have ended this controversy, and a compromise is the only realistic interpretation
of this issue that can be made. In addition, the justification for drug therapy over psychotherapy
often makes the mistake that if a certain supplement to brain chemistry "fixes" the behavioral
component of that therapy, some sort of deficiency or excess is being repaired.
Prozac as Enhancement

The Hastings Center in Garrison, New York has conducted at least two major projects
concerning the role that enhancement technologies play in our society. Issues at hand include,
but are not confined to, the distinction between treatment and enhancement, the social
consequences of large scale enhancement, the medicalization of human experience, the
oppressiveness of suspect social norms, and the ethics of providing, promoting, and participating
in human enhancement through technology. In 1998, the Hastings Center published a collection
of essays about enhancement called Enhancing Human Traits: Ethical and Social Implications,
as part of a larger series on bioethics. Several of the essays are directly concerned with the
matter at hand: the uneasiness felt by many in response to Prozac and other similar drugs that are
used in a sub-clinical setting, with the express purpose of "improving" behavior. As a follow-up
and more specific response to the more controversial issues presented in this volume, the
Hastings Center devoted nearly an entire issue of its Hastings Center Report to discussions of
Prozac and the problematic ethics that surround its use as a cosmetic agent. Several of the essays
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included are direct responses to other commentaries that have been reprinted in order to show an
array of opinions concerning Prozac.
Most of the claims made by these thinkers stress the ethical difficulties raised by Prozac
because of its implications on authenticity and consequences to society. Parens, the editor of

Enhancing Human Traits, discusses issues of enhancement technologies in three categories of
unease: unfairness, complicity, and inauthenticity. First, he discusses unfairness in a social
context. Social stratification as a result of competition made through prescription medicine
could result in unfairness in contemporary society. Under this assumption, money would
become an even greater figure in establishing social worth when psychological functioning at
sub-clinical levels is paid for. Parens cites President Clinton's "Science in the 21 st Century," part
of which states, "Science must not create a new line of separation between the haves and the
have-nots. ,,58
Second, Parens relates worries of complicity. Condoning this theoretical personal use of
psychotropic medication implies complicity in a social phenomenon of potentially drastic
proportions: avoidance of problems among the self, relatives, and peers. This implicates
practitioners, patients, and those establishing mental health policy. 59 Arguments of autonomy in
defense of SSRI therapy dissolve in this perspective, for values must be upheld by those
responsible for controlling the use of medicine.
His final worry, and the one most applicable here, is one of inauthenticity. Turning away
from the vulnerability, imperfection, and finitude that constitutive of life itself could have vast
negative effects on our society according to Parens. Sub-clinical Prozac use risks the loss of
humanity on several levels, and a reconstruction of how we conceive of ourselves. The
consequences he foresees and attributes to authenticity are perhaps more tenebrous and vague
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than those discussed here. They undoubtedly relate to consequences on a larger more social
scale than the more personal arguments of Peter Kramer or Carl Elliott would.
Elliott contributes an article to this work entitled "The Tyranny of Happiness: Ethics and
Cosmetic Psychopharmacology." Elliott's 'ethics of authenticity' can be dissected from out of
his article in the following manner: We often conceive of our life as a project for which we are
ultimately responsible. The significance of that project depends upon the way in which we lead
it and participate in its development. Further, one must be true to oneself, and answer the
question, "How should I live?" by looking inward. The unhappiness into which one's project
has developed is owned, and one is responsible for the results of their own project. An important
distinction made here by Elliott's article is that between authenticity and self-fulfillment. Each is
nebulous in definition, especially when used in a conversational context. DeGrazia and Kramer
argue that Prozac contributes to self-fulfillment, turning authenticity into a different and difficult
construct, and their view seems popular. The two concepts undoubtedly overlap, yet selffulfillment is different, for it implies a quest for success as opposed to a quest for the self.
Authenticity reduces to self-fulfillment when our national ideology tends to stress
personal, individualized success as the primary goal of life. If each of us cannot accept that our
'true' selves may not be successful and wealthy, the authentic self for whom we search becomes
an idealized self that succeeds. Such is the case despite qualities of the experiential self that may
be truly intrinsic to self-definition. A divide arises therefore, between the idealized self that
reaches for fulfillment, and the observed self that strives for expression. This potentially
provides a source for the existential angst and alienation that Elliott discusses as the font of SSRI
popularity. Contemporary culture, evidently stricken with a wave of identity crises, answers to
these issues in one of three ways. We medicate ourselves, to bury the parts of ourselves that we

37

wish didn't exist. We become someone else for a time, to avoid the stress of that which we
really are. We become ourselves through painful and anxious self-confrontation. How can
America resolve the disparity between her ideals of individualism and freedom, and her ideals of
competition and conformity?

A Philosophical Disease
In his rebuttal included in the same 2000 Hastings Center Reporlo, Kramer refers to a notion

that Carl Elliott suggests in "Pursued by Happiness and Beaten Senseless,,,61 and A Philosophical

Disease. 62 Elliott argues that American Capitalist culture is decidedly alienated from a
meaningful sense of identity and purpose. His literary evocations strike readers with images of
despair that come from a societal situation, not a chemical imbalance in the brain. Such a state,
in an era fascinated by technology, medicated by multibillion-dollar industries, individualized by
competition, and driven by a national pursuit of happiness, begs for Prozac. Kramer's
interpretation of the text 63 leads the reader to believe that the popularity of this claim is supported
by the notion that our culture values melancholia and alienation as the appropriate response to
our current situation by suggesting that we find sadness appealing. Furthermore, he suggests that
we think of someone as fake or shallow, even when not on medication, if they seem happy or
extroverted. According to Kramer, we think of Prozac as inauthentic because we think of
happiness as an inappropriate response to our world.
Kramer's claims are valid and truly indicative of the current situation in American
society, yet these generalizations are just that, and are far from pervasive. Further, Elliott does
not seem to want to prove that our society is taking Prozac in response to cultural dilemmas
because he thinks that we should be sad. He expresses a philosophical argument that is
illuminating: we should be sad in response to our cultural situation because we need to change
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our cultural situation. The avoidance of personal anxiety in significant numbers, through drug
induced complacency, could lead to the aggravation of currently destructive social issues.
Acknow ledging our widespread condition of loss and alienation brings us closer to cultural
changes that will create meaning and satisfaction in our lives.
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Final Argumen t
•

Inauthentic personal changes are made in flight from potential authenticity.

The sub-clinical use of Prozac, when other options for self-actualization and the attainment of
desired subjective states is available, even at a sacrifice, is by this premise inauthentic. In order
to move towards authenticity in personal change, one should attempt all means of self-realization
and awareness. The use of Prozac as a component of dual therapy is acceptably authentic here,
as the most common changes to subjective experience induced by Prozac are more conducive to
therapy than dysthymia,64 generalized anxiety, or mild OCD.

•

Specific actions or personal projects conducted so as to escape from an anxiety-provoking
element of personal experience increase ambiguity and therefore reduce personal
authenticity.

Under this premise, many forms of therapy would be deemed inauthentic. Idealistically,
psychodynamic 65 therapy confronts anxiety and treats it as the manifestation of repressed past
experiences (e.g. oedipal conflicts, child abuse) and could therefore be used in an authentic
fashion here. It could be easily argued, however, that the experience of psychodynamic therapy
itself brings about remission of undesired psychological states and that actual resolution of
internalized conflict is a subjective illusion. Many forms of therapy such as cognitivebehavioral66 therapy would be just as guilty as drug therapy of treating symptoms directly in
order to avoid the confrontation of the experiential source. Clients that actively or through
encouragement undergo monotherapy with psychotropic medication, again when other options
are feasible, can be described as undergoing an inauthentic change by this premise.

•

A change made in avoidance of or in replacement for personal knowledge must be
inauthentic.

Again, the notion of avoidance and escape returns, telling us not to evade our selves, but rather to
confront the things about ourselves that most disturb us. Resolution and awareness are of critical

40

importance here, for authenticity demands this confrontation. Kierkegaard's builds his
philosophy of authentic action on the idea that anxiety is a necessary good that tells us that
something is wrong in our lives. The only way to truly resolve such anxiety is through
confrontation and internalization - which requires self-evaluation. Nesse's evolutionary
approach is important here as well, for it stresses the same notions of anxiety from a biological
perspective. Both humanistic and mechanistic schemas support the claim, which makes it
difficult to undermine through theory. When specifically applied to SSRI use, this claim
reiterates the importance of intention. If an individual chooses with determination, to resolve the
self and through self-awareness change essential characteristics of the self, and a prescription
drug either facilitates or contributes to this process, such a change would not necessarily reduce
the authenticity of such a project. If, however, Prozac is an escape and an "easy out," the
individual removes himself from his own authentic nature.
•

Confrontation of personal conflict is authentic in nature, while circumvention of personal
conflict is inauthentic.

An important, relevant, and perhaps understated notion that surrounds this issue of SSRI
treatment is the escape metaphor. Escape from the self is not the only important behavior that
should be addressed, however. Interpersonal relationships require commitments that often take
the form of support structures. When someone close to another who is dealing with difficulties
in their psychological well-being finds that the distressed has escaped them without resolving the
issues that have affected the two together, it often leaves the support partner empty and without
resolution. In addition, problems of depression and anxiety are often intimately connected to
specific relationship situations. A pharmacological escape from such problems leaves the
interpersonal situation and its problems on the shoulders of the other who has not chosen to
resolve the issues chemically. Just as alcoholism provides an escape in this way and is

41

uncontroversially destructive for this reason, Prozac use has great potential for creating
inauthentic relationships. In order for a change in an interpersonal context to be authentic, both
parties should address and confront those problems precipitating the change.
•

Personal changes that are made explicitly in order to remove those qualities that set an
individual apart from his natural grouping can be described as inauthentic under
McDonough's Aristotelian model.

If a patient or client who is experiencing mild social anxiety disorder, for example, asks for

Prozac in order to become more sociable like the rest of her peers, her request may be described
as inauthentic. Likewise, were an individual with a melancholic personality compelled by a
doctor or family member to take Prozac in order to become more "normal," such behavior would
be called inauthentic by this assumption. The medicalization of psychological states has driven
perceptions of this kind forward since the development of the categorical model of
psychopathological behavior. A distinction must be made that states that endangerment or pain
in an individual may be perceived differently. The works of Heidegger and Kierkegaard may
disagree, however, on the foundation that emotional suffering and anxiety must be confronted
directly in order for personal change to become truly authentic. Works such as Fear and
Trembling and The Stranger would suggest that sadness or despair should be dealt with head-on,
and under any case avoidance of personal experience would be inauthentic.
•

Authentic choice must be made with self-possession, genuine pathos, and regard for all
temporal modes.

With this assumption, one can describe situations of sub-clinical Prozac use as inauthentic in
three ways. First, if a client were to begin taking Prozac with little or no personal contemplation
or self-evaluation, one could say that such was done without self-possession. Further, this
implies that the choice to take Prozac must be deliberate and determined in order to meet
qualifications of authenticity. Second, the client must choose Prozac with valid and authentic
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grief. This is difficult to imagine. Sadness or emotional intensity may drive a person to try
Prozac as a way of relieving suffering, but one can hardly imagine someone choosing to take it
order to embrace and confront the negative emotions one experiences. As above, however, this
authenticity is feasible under said premise if intuitive therapy is impossible or great difficulty
arises in the therapy due to the negative emotional states. Finally, one must regard all temporal
modes when making an existential choice in order for it to maintain authenticity. A patient or
her therapist/doctor could be theoretically ignoring all three temporal modes through the use of
Prozac. If past experiences are in any way related to the negative affect Prozac is intended to
treat, this sphere of experience is avoided in most cases of monotherapy. If present situations
such as occupation or life style are being treated through Prozac, one avoids the current self. If
the potential future of an individual is purposefully shaped into some false representation of
either another person or of a society, his future has been falsely decided.
•

The choice of the private self is more authentic than the choice of the public ethos.

To choose one' s own identity over that which is generally supported by the public is almost
intuitively authentic. This assumption is not necessarily valid across all situations, however.
One would legitimately label a certain choice as inauthentic if it were made strictly in order to be
different from that of the public. A change made specifically for the sake of being different
rather than for the sake of a certain personality trait or significant experience. One could also
make a valid choice that agrees with the public ethos, in harmony with the self. We do this often
- even many times per day for the sake of social harmony and stability. To make a move that
intrinsically shifts the personality away from its original state for the sake of the public ethos
would be inauthentic, however. Taking Prozac without additional therapy would be
categorically inauthentic, since one would have little need for Prozac if one were not interested
in taking an active role in changing elements of his personality.
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•

When choice is not made in an active process of either the self, or the public, the "monstrous
abstraction" that is the public will choose for us. Passive acceptance of this exterior will,
and the influence it has on our un chosen choices is inauthentic.

Similarly to the previous premise, this idea delineates social behavior as typically authentic or
inauthentic; yet here the distinction lies between the activity and passivity of a choice made in a
social setting. Again, there is little reason to look at the large array of related inauthentic
behavior (that would be called such as a result of this assumption) as good or bad, right or
wrong. Central to the point, however, is the notion that if very important, questionable changes
are made for this reason, the compromise to authenticity will be significant.

•

Any process of personal change necessitates personal knowledge before it can be described
as authentic.

Those claims discussed above contribute to this qualification of authenticity. It has been stated
that changes made in avoidance of personal awareness are inauthentic, yet this is also distinctly
important to an understanding of authentic personal change. The act of avoidance in itself does
not solely contribute to the inauthenticity of personal changes. More generally, personal changes
that do not account for this self-awareness - though they may not represent escape -likewise
make a move to undermine authenticity. Heidegger's notion of everydayness embodies the idea
behind this qualification of authenticity.67 Personal changes that do not account for selfawareness occur on a regular, if not daily basis in each of us. In the context of SSRI drug
therapy, one could argue that most individuals lead an inauthentic lifestyle by definitions such as
the one listed above. How then, can one justify changes to current practices concerning drug
therapy with this assumption as support? The possibility that many members of our society are
relying on yet another escape from self-recognition is great. One can compare Prozac use to beer
or marijuana, and the argument seemingly melts away. There is an essentially problematic
reason that Prozac use should be evaluated on a different level. Doctors and mental health
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practitioners maintain a healer's role. It is not a medical responsibility to administer beer to
patients who are having a difficult time with work or lifestyle. SSRI's, unlike beer, would be a
serious and drastic method of absolving woes and discomforts - the class of drugs is monitored
by the FDA as a prescription medication because of side-effects and an evident need for
responsible administration of the drug. Social and individual consequences of widespread
Prozac use are discussed throughout medical literature on the subject, yet at the core Prozac is
different from beer because it is the responsibility of medical professionals to carefully
administer the drug professionally. If someone comes to a doctor seeking therapy or healing of
the self, it is the doctor's responsibility to provide this end. Further, if that patient believes their
condition to be strictly biological without biological evidence, they may not accurately interpret
this condition and should not be held responsible for its diagnosis. It therefore falls upon the
doctor's shoulders to conscientiously determine the most appropriate means of treatment for such
a hypothetical patient. Because the suitable treatment potentially includes personal therapy,
medical professionals should be held responsible for acknowledging the importance of this
distinction.
•

Authentic self-evaluation must point inward and seek knowledge that independently
differentiates the individual.

Just as the former claim asserts that authenticity requires self-knowledge through the
existentialist construct of everydayness, this claim builds a plea for self-knowledge upon
Heidegger's notion of averageness. Differentiation is as important to authenticity as selfevaluation. One leaves behind the same qualities of the self that potentially contribute to
authentic change if one ignores or denies individuality. We are all the product of our
experiences to some degree. Setting aside strictly biological approaches to the self, one must
accept that this self, for whom an authentic individual strives, is unique because each of us has a

45

unique set of experiences. Therefore, differentiation of the products of those experiences is a
necessary property of valid self-evaluation.

•

Only through accepting one's own self and experiencing its owned anxiety can one approach
personal authenticity.

Self-acceptance works its way into a discussion of authenticity and self-awareness because if one
denies the attributes of the self that one attempts to change, one cannot truly understand why one
has become the person that he is. Understanding is crucial to authentic change because a person
may become a distinct though desirable person through a change without understanding, yet an
authentic change of self would be one of transition and evolution rather than one of replacement.
Changes induced by Prozac are not understood on an internal level unless a process including
self-evaluation occurs. If one prescribes Prozac to remove unaccepted attributes of a patient that
has not attempted to understand these attributes, this practitioner contributes to a change in his
patient that undermines that individual's authentic self. Psychotherapy proposes a method by
which the patient takes on those traits that are undesirable and owns them in order to attain
control of them. Such a change is authentic, for it confronts and accepts the self both before and
after rather than removing one for the preferable other.

•

The perception of anxiety as an element of imbalance due to a foreign agent is far less
authentic than the perception of anxiety as an element of balance owned by the essentially
experiential self

Our conception of depression and anxiety often contributes to our understanding of authentic
development. A medicalized self, with any undesirable traits explained away by chemical
imbalances, does not support experience and personal differentiation as the assertions above
would require of the authentic self. Ownership, acceptance, awareness, understanding, and
resolution are all denied when conditions of valid human experience are washed away by
medical terminology and diagnoses. This destructive biological materialism that pervades
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American society reduces our interior selves to alien attributes that should be monitored and
maintained rather than behaviors and emotions that are the results of our own experiences and
choices.
Conclusion

I do not deign to assert that everyone should seek authenticity. Heidegger himself never
explicitly states that authenticity is a manifest good. Each of the categories through which he
describes human modes of behavior can be used as a means of evaluating an individual's
approach to the self. Nevertheless, the description of one particular category in his list as
necessarily good becomes problematic and paternalistic. The purpose of this analysis is to
clarify the authentic or inauthentic nature of drug therapy in the specific context so frequently
debated upon in professional journals. By the evaluations established here, arguments describing
Prozac use as inauthentic and likewise those describing it as inauthentic are supported or
undermined depending on specific contextual elements' of each theoretical situation. It becomes
essential, therefore, to stress the importance of medical professionals who act in an educated and
conscientious manner, effectively and appropriately approaching each case with ethical and
critical scrutiny. Doctors, just as any other person, will make mistakes; and likewise just as there
are people who act without ethical consideration, there will be doctors who do the same.
There is not an inherent assumption in the arguments presented here that members of the
medical profession act whole or in part unethically, and as a result require philosophical
valuations to correct this behavior. The point, on the other hand, is to emphasize the degree to
which the construct of authenticity plays a critical role in psychological and psychiatric treatment
of these sub-clinical disorders. If a patient or client requests a specific treatment such as Prozac,
it is ultimately the practitioner's responsibility to determine the nature of the request and
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diagnose the potential problems at the root of the request. Authenticity has been used in vague
and indeterminate ways in order to defend or criticize drug therapy since the release of Prozac.
Through the clarifications of this analysis of authenticity, a more methodological and logical
approach to the issues at hand arises, and a more critical interpretation of these arguments is
possible. However, such clarification of academic issues is not the only benefit of ungerstanding
authenticity in the context of drug therapy.
Arguments made based on existential ideals such as authenticity are important to an
evaluation of our culture, at least part of which has an evident respect for existentialism, and
currently struggles with identity and authenticity on a level that is indicative of a social unease.
Although practitioners are ultimately responsible for the administration of these drugs, we must
acknowledge our own role in establishing our lives and identities. We want to succeed, but
evidence of the condition of our ethos lies in our popular culture, and it is telling us that we do
not accept success-fulfillment at any cost as an acceptable approach to life. If we value personal
authenticity and self-resolution, we are responsible for monitoring the effects that phenomena
such as Prozac have on our society as a whole. Complacent emptiness is not an attribute that
many Americans would be proud to call our own - and we should therefore express and confront
our discontent, rather than hiding behind the comfort of a cosmetic drug.
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